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[For details of Communist policies toward various sociological, political, and economic aspects of present-day China, see the entire text in category 116.]

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631 Peking was a primary attraction to these military despots. It was still the national capital of the Republic and carried on the fiction of governing China. Through control of the phantom government at Peking, various warlords were able to enrich themselves by arranging loans from Japan in return for favors that sacrificed China's interests.

Most notorious of the warlord rulers of Peking was Tuan Ch'i-jui. A former staff officer of the Pei-yang Army and premier under Yüan, he retained the latter position after Yüan's death and controlled the central government through leadership of a military faction called the Anfu Clique (an for Anhwei and peace, fu for Fukien and good fortune). His dominance of the government was alternately shared with or disputed by two other similar groups: the Chihli (Hopei) Clique headed by Ts'ao K'un, later by Wu P'ei-fu; and the Fengtien (South Manchuria) Clique led by Chang Tso-lin, after 1928 by his son Chang Hsüeh-liang. From 1923, Feng Yü-hsiang, until then the chief lieutenant of Wu P'ei-fu, become an independent and additional element in the dominance of Peking. In consort, the warlords ousted from Peking the 1911 parliamentary rule.

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668 While Hopei and the capital were experiencing almost constant warfare and

642 changes in governing personnel, Shansi was
701 held firmly by Yen Hsi-shan. A native of
631 the province, he had controlled it since
668 becoming military governor under Yüan Shih-k'ai. After the Kuomintang armies embarked on the Northern Expedition to unite all China, Yen temporarily cast in his lot with the movement. His seizure of Peking in June 1928 under the revolutionary banner marked the last step in the Kuomintang's nominal unification of China. On June 21, the name of the capital of China for almost 650 years was changed from Peking to Peiping (actually from Pei-ching or Northern Capital to Pei-p'ing or Northern Peace), and Nanking (Nan-ching or Southern Capital) was made the political center of China.

642 The nominal unification of the country
701 did not bring an end to turmoil in the northern
631 provinces nor their subservience to the Nanking Government. Yen retained his control over Shansi and made a bid for dominance of Hopei as well. In ephemeral alliances with or against Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang Hsüeh-liang, and the Kuomintang, he continued the struggle until Chang committed himself to the Nationalist Government in 1930. The Fengtien leader eliminated his rivals from Hopei with the help of Nanking and was given command of the area between the Great Wall and the Yellow River as well as the task of bringing his domain in Manchuria into closer alignment with the

185 most famous leaders were the chancellor of the Peking University, Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, and the faculty he had gathered around him. The original emphasis of these men was on China's need for individualism, science, and democracy. After the Bolshevik victory in Russia, some of these intellectual leaders like Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao turned toward Communism as the answer to China's needs. Other leaders at Peking such as Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei and Hu Shih continued to espouse individualism, science, and democracy.[26]

• 668 Li Ta-chao, a native of Hopei, is now honored by the Communists as the leading figure in the formation of the Chinese Communist Party, although Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a far more influential figure in the early Communist movement and headed the party from its founding in 1921 until made the scapegoat for the Communist failure to achieve power in 1927. However, Li Ta-chao was one of the first prominent Chinese to embrace Marxism, one of the founders of the Communist Party in China, and a dedicated worker in spreading its influence. He gave the penniless Mao Tse-tung a job on the latter's arrival at Peking in 1918 and was instrumental in developing Mao's trend toward Marxism.

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26. On the New Culture Movement and its leaders see Fairbank and Teng, op. cit., pp. 231-258. On the Communist phase of the movement see ibid.; and Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1951, pp. 7-27.

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668 Ch'en Tu-hsiu played a secondary role in this regard, according to Mao.[27] In 1927, Li was arrested and executed for his radical activities by Chang Tso-lin.

185 668 The culmination of the New Culture Movement was the May Fourth Movement of 1919. It began as a series of demonstrations by the students of Peking University in protest against the Versailles Treaty provision validating Japanese control of Shantung. The students launched demonstrations and propaganda campaigns that grew into a national movement and anti-Japanese boycott joined by bankers, merchants, and other articulate sections of the country. It forced the resignation of the warlord government of Tuan Ch'i-jui, moved the Chinese delegation to refuse to sign the Versailles Treaty, instigated a rising tide of nationalism at home, and turned China away from trust and hope in the Western powers and toward a search for salvation through the aid of the Soviet Union and the use of Communist organization and methods. From the May Fourth Movement can also

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27. See Mao's autobiography as recorded by Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, New York, Random House, 1938, pp. 134, 140-41.

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185 668 be traced the injection of strength and substance into the Kuomintang and the birth of the Communist Party. The Communist regime recognizes a debt to the May Fourth Movement and views it as the source of the revolutionary stream which carried the Communists to victory.[28]

Another nationwide movement was inspired by the Peking University students at the end of 1935 when North China was coming under increasing Japanese control. Protesting against Nanking's appeasement of Japan, the students in Peking demanded an immediate cessation of civil war between the Nationalist Government and the Communists, the resistance of a united China against Japanese inroads in

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28. The student role in the May Fourth Movement and subsequent events is described in Kiang (Chiang) Wen-han, The Chinese Student Movement, New York, Kings Crown Press, 1948, pp. 75-102. On the reorientation of the Kuomintang, the rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and Russia's role in both, see MacNair, op. cit., pp. 65-227, Schwartz, op. cit.; T'ang Leang (Liang) -li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution, London, G. Routledge and Sons, 1930; Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, rev. ed., Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953; Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1953.

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185 North China, the institution of democracy
668 and individual rights, and the participation in the government of non-Kuomintang groups, including representatives of the Communist Party. The program was denounced by the Nanking Government, which continued to insist that national unification through the military defeat of the Communists must precede resistance against Japan and the inauguration of democracy in China.

Because the program favored the Communists at a time when the "United Front" policy of the Comintern was in force, they endorsed the student proposals. But so did the non-Communist middle-class and professional groups throughout China. Following the student lead, National Salvation Association units were organized everywhere in the country, and the informal membership of the movement in 1936 grew to third party proportions. Despite the jailing of its adult and student leaders by the government, the association continued to insist that Chiang Kai-shek was the only possible leader of a united China. The movement's activities in educating large segments of the population to an awareness of the nation's peril, was in large part responsible for the enthusiasm, spontaneity, and scope of the public response that greeted Chiang's decision in 1937 to resist Japan.[29]

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29. Kiang (Chiang), op. cit., pp. 101-33; Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 175-78; and Bisson, op. cit., pp. 135-47.

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IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. The Beginning of Communism in Peking

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668 The possibilities of Communism as a solution for China's ills was first entertained by some of the leaders of the New Culture Movement at Peking University. In 1918, Li Ta-chao formed at the university a Society for the Study of Marxism which included Mao Tse-tung among its membership. Ch'en Tu-hsiu approved of the group's activities, although he took no part in them. In May 1919, an entire issue of the New Culture Movement's leading journal, Hsin Ch'ing-nien (New Youth or La jeunesse), was devoted to the outcome of the study group's investigations. The articles, including one by Li Ta-chao, were on the whole critical and analytical rather than partisan. Yet within a year, both the organizer of the study group and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were in the Marxist camp.[30]

668 While Ch'en left Peking for Shanghai, Li stayed in the capital and organized a labor group. The lack of Communist sympathizers

30. Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 7-36; North, op. cit., pp. 53-71.

668 in Peking at the time is evident from the composition of the group, which included only two Communists and six anarchists. The shift in Li's and Ch'en's flirtation with Communism to complete acceptance of it seems to have been influenced by the Soviet Union's offer to cancel its privileges in China, by the student-inspired May Fourth Movement with its overtones of hostility toward the West, and by the arrival of the Communist agent Voitinsky in China. He saw Li at Peking in 1920 and
668 665 was referred by him to Ch'en in Shanghai. The same year at Shanghai, Ch'en was present at the meeting of some eight intellectuals who discussed the formation of a Communist Party in China. At the time, a Communist group existed at Peking as well as at several other centers. In 1921, Li Ta-chao was one of the organizers of the Chinese Communist Party at Peking.

668 With the formal inauguration of the Chinese Communist Party, its direction by the Comintern, and co-operation with the Kuomintang, Communist activities in China were centered in Canton and Shanghai. Communist influence was minor in Shansi and Hopei thereafter until just prior to the Japanese invasion of China. In concert with Communist parties everywhere, the Chinese Communists announced an anti-fascist (anti-Japan) "United Front" policy in late 1935. This program and the Nationalist

668 Government's inaction gained sympathy for the Communists among the patriotic elements in North China. A large part of the student group, always to the left of the Kuomintang ideologically, was particularly drawn toward the Communists in their "United Front" phase, and many young people from the universities streamed to the Communist center at Yenan before and after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan.

B. Communism in the Resistance War against Japan

668 721 The first large-scale entry of the Communists into the North China Region occurred during the resistance war against Japan. Their Eighth Route Army moved from Shensi into neighboring Shansi in 1937 to fight the Japanese forces entering the passes along the Great Wall. As the Japanese armies swept south to Taiyuan, the Communist forces remained in northeast Shansi to engage in guerrilla warfare. In January 1938, representatives of the Communist Party, the Kuomintang, Yen Hsi-shan's provincial administration, and other groups established the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region with central government approval to continue the fight against Japan. While the forces of Yen Hsi-shan and the Nationalist Government faced the enemy in southern Shansi, the Eighth Route

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668 Army carried guerrilla warfare into the rural
721 areas of Shansi, Hopei, Chahar, and Jehol, and central and northern Shansi.[31]

668 Functioning as a collection of separate
701 armed bands rather than as a group, the Eighth Route Army maintained scattered rural bases isolated from one another by Japanese forces concentrated in the cities and along communication routes. Local peasants and former students and professors from Peking and Tientsin were drawn into the army or trained as an irregular militia guarding the villages. Because the Communist army existed behind enemy lines and lacked independent finances, it was forced to cultivate the good will of the local Chinese populace. Political cadres operating with the army established local governments, encouraged a high degree of local participation in them, lowered the taxes of the poorer peasants,

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31. On the Eighth Route Army and the Communist areas see Gunther Stein, The Challenge of Red China, New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945, pp. 324, 328-30, and map facing p. 458; White and Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 199-213; Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 116-23, 159-75; and U.S. Office of Strategic Services, The Guerrilla Front in North China, Washington, D.C. 1943.

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668 suspended rents due absentee landlords who
70 had gone over to the Japanese, and organized production co-operatives for the benefit of the army and the local people.

For the people of North China, it was a new experience to encounter a government which did not exploit them and an army which did not pillage, rape, and kill civilians. The grasping administrators and rapacious armies of the provincial governments had been followed by the even more predatory army and administration of the Japanese. Almost wholly lacking in political and social consciousness before the arrival of the Eighth Route Army, the rural people of North China began to hear from the army commissars and from the refugee students and professors the radical and liberal ideas with which other areas of China had been concerned for a quarter of a century. The reaction of the North China people to the change-over from the expedient and necessarily liberal, democratic policy of wartime Communism to the ruthless, regimented policy of the present-day Communist regime is impossible to determine, but it is likely these people now feel the Communist wartime program was a lulling interlude to encourage their acceptance and promotion of a government more disciplined but no less exploitive than its predecessors.

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C. Victory of the Communist Party

701 At the end of the war, Communist forces
668 were scattered throughout the North China Region.
631 With few exceptions, the Communists were in command wherever the authority of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region Government reached. Other border region governments unrecognized by Chungking had been established by the Communists at the juncture of Shansi-Suiyuan, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, Shansi-Hopei-Honan, and Hopei-Shantung-Honan. The countryside surrounding these bases was largely under the supervision of roving guerrilla units of the Eighth Route Army.

668 After the surrender of Japan, the
669 Communists' design to solidify their control over the entire North China Region by accepting the surrender of Japanese troops in the major cities was thwarted by the Kuomintang. Yen Hsi-shan seized Taiyuan, and American air and naval transport facilities ferried National Government forces to the major cities of North China before the Communists reached them on foot. The only important city in the North occupied and held by the Communists for a time was Kalgan (Chang-chia-k'ou) along the Great Wall in northern Hopei. Through this key rail junction the Communists were able to funnel troops into Manchuria, where Soviet Union occupation enabled them to take

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668 669 Japanese arms and ammunition and occupy most of the region.[32]

In the civil war that almost immediately followed the defeat of Japan, the Communists in North China concentrated on holding actions and the disruption of rail communications. These tactics not only handicapped the Nationalist Government in supplying its troops in Manchuria, where the main struggle in the civil war was being fought, but also helped to cripple the national economy south of the Yellow River.

After Manchuria had been won by the Communist forces in early November 1938, they were regrouped as the Fourth Field Army and funnelled into Hopei by way of the coastal pass at Shan-hai-kuan. Reinforced by troops from North China, the Fourth Field Army launched a full-scale offensive in the Peking-Tientsin-Kalgan triangle in December. Tientsin fell on January 15, 1949. The Nationalist army in

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32. The names, dates, and campaigns, connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to these facts in so far as can be determined by checking other, scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1954, pp. 36-38, 50-54, 60-64, 89-92, 104-105.

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668 669 Peking under the command of Fu Tso-i accepted Communist surrender terms and withdrew from the city on January 22, permitting the Red Army to enter the capital in a triumphal march on January 31, 1949. The capture of these cities and Communist campaigns in the area between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers caused a general withdrawal of Nationalist forces to the south bank of the Yangtze.

The Communists paused to regroup their troops, while talking peace with the Kuomintang, before resuming the offensive in late April. Taiyuan was taken on April 24, and the remaining cities held by the Nationalists in Shansi fell by early May, placing all North China within the Great Wall in Communist hands. North of the frontier barrier, western Suiyuan held out until September, when anti-Communist forces laid down their arms.

668 During the course of the North China campaign, popular opinion was increasingly hostile to the Kuomintang, when not sympathetic to the Communists. Red Army control of the countryside and disruption of communication routes prevented the Nationalist Government from solving the food and inflation crises in the cities. Its use of troops that had served the Japanese during the war, reinstatement of pre-war officials, and inability to control the reversion of soldiers and administrators to

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• 668 their prewar tendencies undermined popular allegiance to Nanking. Kuomintang graft and corruption further lowered the loyalty and morale of the people and the Nationalist armies.

Meanwhile the Communists were continuing to stress their wartime democratic policy in the countryside and to promise to the articulate element a Communist rule on the moderate lines drawn by Mao Tse-tung in his New Democracy. Sick of fighting, the population longed for any regime which would restore peace and stability. For the peasants out of reach of Communist influence, the struggle for power in China was none of their business. They stood aside, waiting for the winner to emerge, and accepted the victory of the Red Army as the beginning of a new dynasty which had inherited the "mandate of heaven" from the discredited Kuomintang.[33]

33. For an account by a trained observer of the initial reaction of the people of Peking to the Communist victory in the North see Derk Bodde, Peking Diary: A Year of Revolution, New York, Schuman, 1950.

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565 During this period of social and political
701 disorder, military men began to gain power,
517 obtaining offices by virtue of their military
178 success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skill, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

565 The Chinese Communists interpret the exist-
668 ing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949) Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese

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668 nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the people, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the people. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers through collectivization of agriculture or into urban workers through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the New Democratic Stage and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved" by bureaucratic capitalism, were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the New Democratic Stage formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists as the conclusion of the New Democratic Stage and the beginning of a transitional

stage which will lead China to socialism. Land reform is completed and the landlords as a class are eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists and merchants have been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the "ideology of the working class" has been established in all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

The Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." They acknowledge that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz., the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most of the Chinese workers are fresh from the village where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to acquire the ideology of the working class.

The classification of people according to the ideology they profess is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of the Com-

565 668 munist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

555 668 178 Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the Federation of Democratic Women, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of high learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement

555 178 448 of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement has emerged. The mastery of an officially approved body of doctrine is the quickest road to social advancement. The Communist channel of social advancement leads to the selection of conformists. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas contained in the classics and their commentaries was the prerequisite to success in the imperial examinations.

The Communist regime has found it necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with the traditional social mobility, the new social mobility under the Communist regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party.

In the development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises may conceivably absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social mobility continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to

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555 provide a flow of scapegoats for the grievances
198 which accumulate under a totalitarian system,
668 and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in the North China Region the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been mainly limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[12]

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12. Consult the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.

and marriage attachments through the ideal and officially sanctioned method of mutual participation in production, indoctrination, and study. A 1955 report on Marriage Law implementation admitted that "in the extensive rural districts... the conditions for adequate communal life and avenues for social intercourse" are lacking. As a result, "most marriages are still being contracted after both parties were first introduced to each other by third parties." The report hastened to explain that as the bride and groom gave their previous agreement to the marriage it was to be regarded as a marriage of free will and not to be confused with the old and outlawed practice of arranged marriage.[37]

E. Replacement of the Family's Social, Economic, and Political Role

A second step taken by the Communist regime to change radically the nature and function of the Chinese family was accomplished with the establishment of organizations to regiment every phase of human endeavor. The labor unions in the city, the peasant associations, mutual aid teams, and co-operatives in the country became the center not only of economic life, but of social political, and indoctrination activities as well. Unions were organized in the cities almost as they fell to the Communist armies, but the formation of comparable institutions in the countryside awaited the gradual process of land reform.

37. Ibid., 1002, p. 3.

596 Until it was completed in any area, no alternate
575 organization to the family existed to assume its
668 socio-economic role. This fact seems to ex-
871 plain why the Communists during the spring of 1953 limited their marriage law campaign in the countryside to those areas where land reform had been accomplished.

Special organizations were set up to train and absorb the energies of women and children who might otherwise be free of the constant direct influence of the government. These two groups were absorbed respectively into the All-China Democratic Federation of Women and into the Young Pioneers, the Federation of Democratic Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.

596 Aside from its primary role as a unit for
668 procreation and for child-care until the young
871 reached an age when they would prove adaptable to molding by the state, the family was left only with the secondary duty of supporting the state training process. An editorial in the People's Daily in mid-1955 pointed out the "deep solic-
of the government toward children, made manifest by the establishment of nurseries and schools and the teaching of proper attitudes toward children and the correct methods for educating them. "The new Socialist generation" was to be brought up "physically strong, courageous, honest, fond of study, patriotic, and imbued with collective spirit." The editorial also stated that trade unions were to help office

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employees and workers to learn how to educate their children" Teachers and directors of the Young Pioneers were to assume the "important responsibility" of guiding children in classrooms, meetings, and extra-curricular activities.[38]

With the Communist regime's emphases on youth, loyalty to the state, socialist construction, and the rooting out of feudalistic and bourgeois ideas, the problem of the proper attitude of youth toward parents needed clarification. An article on the subject in the January 1955 issue of China Youth emphasizes that "respect for one's parents is part of ...individual or social Communist morals," but the attitude "must be governed by the interests of the Revolution." If the parents are counterrevolutionaries who have been pardoned by the people and are still able to work, they should be made to Reform-through-labor, and should not be pitied or helped. Only if they are unable to support themselves should they be aided by the children, "for if the children do not support them, then the burden will fall on the state, which is obviously undesirable." As to bourgeois parents, they should normally be shown respect and concern; but if they break the law, "the children should justly and dispassionately examine their crime." Working class parents "should of course be respected, loved, and taken care of." They should not be discriminated against or ridiculed because of the shortcomings

38. Ibid., 1064, pp. 11-13.

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they have inherited from the old regime, but "should be patiently persuaded to see the light."[39]

V. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NORTH CHINA REGION

A. Diverse Influences on Family Life

Several conflicting influences on family organization and function have been present in the North China Region during the last twenty-five years. Until the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the disruptive forces of industrialization and revolutionary ideas on ancient family patterns were less prevalent in the North China Region than in the Central-South and East China regions. Tientsin was the only city in the North China Region where industrialization had made any appreciable headway, and warlord rule in the region had precluded any wide dissemination of new social and political ideas. Olga Lang's study of family trends in China just before the outbreak of the war showed that within comparable socio-economic groups modern tendencies were less apparent in unindustrialized Peiping than in industrialized Tientsin, but that in neither city were modern trends as prevalent as in Shanghai.[40] Sydney Gamble's prewar investigation of the rural area of Ting hsien in Hopei indicated that some modern

39. Ibid., 973, pp. 30-32.
40. Lang, op. cit., pp. 120-327.

another focus of social life, particularly in the towns and cities. Their rituals, passports, and secret signs of greeting were all subordinate to their basic aim, which was to provide members with security-through-association and a refuge against the hazards of a disintegrating and increasingly predatory society.

It will be noted that the ties of kinship and custom were strong, extending even into the large modern cities and the farm towns. Urban and rural ways of life tended increasingly to diverge, yet one of the strongest cohesive forces of all was the common set of attitudes and values which, even when change has been accounted for, held together all Chinese of village and town and city.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNISM

In discussing Communist efforts to alter the Chinese way of life, it should be stressed that our material is unsatisfactory. Statistics, declarations, news releases give few realistic details of life in the villages under Communist domination, and most refugees from Communist China have come from the cities.

First of all, the farmer's annual routine is basically unchanged. Pilot collectives are in operation, but these are few and have no immediate bearing on the farmer's work year. The most striking change in the farmer's life is the new network of associations which the government has imposed upon him and the daily barrage of advice and exhortation to which he is subjected.

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are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism in order to undermine the old values and instill the new.

The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulties.[15] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives in the countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[16]

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13. Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Harvard, Russian Research Center, 1952, p. 25.

14. Ibid., p. 28.

15. W. W. Rostow, The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

16. Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, April 20, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 1036, April 28, 1955.

178 668 The cadre carried on the continuing effort to destroy traditional mores, which are prime resistants in what the Communists call the long and difficult process of ideological and social reform. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[17]

The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to increase his family's land holdings is checked by fear lest he be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency," has not been crushed, and the land-holdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[18]

The effort to force various forms of co-operative work has not been completely successful:

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17. People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

18. Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites Peking People's Daily, Feb. 13, 1954.

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"...when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..." [19]

Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic, and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure-time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take more of his liesure. The slack winter season may now findhim in winter school or involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

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Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at village level.[20] The New Year festival itself is

19. Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.
20. SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.

characterized by some traditional activities, modified to promote government aims, and by some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[21] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist standards.[22] The government may allow some additional food for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life has been so thoroughly organized that it can no longer be restricted to family and friends. The peasants have been urged to organize their own dramatic troupes to play the approved repertoire, now brought to the villages by traveling troupes. Special mobile teams trained to deliver organized "cultural lectures"; or to show films dramatizing the new order have been moving steadily through the Chinese countryside. The old exchange of visits to relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's "progress in Communist reconstruction."[23]

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21. Enlightenment Daily, Jan.23,1955,p.2.

22. Cf. the collection of mottoes in Huanan T'ung-shu [South China Almanac], Canton 1953, p. 32.

23. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23,1955,p.2

668 The seasonal pilgrimage, in company,
527 to some famous shrine also has it Communist
198 counterpart: mass pilgrimages to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being publicized as a national shrine.[24] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[25]

Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved festival, presumably because of its function as a celebration of kinship ties and family continuity. The next approved traditional holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June. The boat races have been revived, and the poet Ch'ü Yüan, now a "people's hero, martyred in protest against a corrupt feudal regime," is the focus of celebrations.[26] The moon festival in autumn is also celebrated with extra food allowances and "cultural" activities. The various anniversaries of the Chinese Communists and of the world Communist movement probably do not break into the agricultural working year, but may be the occasion for special propaganda arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen
178 668 that the pattern of living in the villages has been drastically altered; what remains of the old pattern consists of elements too deeply ingrained

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.; also, SCMP, 972, 1954, p. 21.
26. SCMP, 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

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178 to be abruptly altered without precipitating a
668 crisis, useful to the Communists in the interest of morale, or adaptable in the promotion of their rural program of change and indoctrination.

III. CHANGING PATTERNS OF LIVING

668 In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete commitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[27]

City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, which serve further to mold urban life into the new pattern. The townsman, more than the peasant, is open to

27. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.
28. Cf., "Regulations of Urban Organizations," Current Background, 310, Jan. 17,1955.

668 an "around the clock" propaganda barrage. From the first call to early morning calisthenics, the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are 668 527 celebrated in the cities with great parades and endless speeches. Privacy and chance to be at ease with family or friends are rare.

The New Year's holiday has some of its old gaiety, although subject to the same restrictions imposed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, as they appear to do at the mid-autumn and Dragon Boat festivals, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a minority of the urban population.[29]

A Communist press account of the New Year's activities in Peking in 1955 suggest the way in which the old and new are blended. Firecrackers, in the traditional pattern, were set off on New Year's Eve. On New Year's Day people crowded the streets and made mass visits to the holiday fair in the southwestern part of the city. Kites, balloons, and dolls were available for children, and some were given model airplanes bearing the slogan "We

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29. Enlightenment Daily, Jan.23,1955,p.2. In preparation for the New Year exodus from cities in 1955, the Ministry of Railways estimated that "over three and a half million more people will travel than on normal days, mostly to join in united family celebrations of the holiday." NCNA dispatch, Jan. 19,1955; SCMP,972, Jan. 20, 1955, p. 21.

668 must liberate Taiwan." Theaters and cinemas
527 were crowded, and continuous and varied shows--each no doubt with its ideological message --were performed in the "Working People's Palace of Culture." Further innovations symbolic of the new order were an exhibition by Soviet skaters, chess tournament, the finals of the city soccer tournament, entertainments by workers' amateur troupes.[30]

668 The cities have been cleaned up and en-
511 larged, and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, although improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers, the favored class in the drive for industrialization.[31] Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[32] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This
668 identification and the opportunities offered by
183 the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he was once in returning to a plot of land

30. NCNA dispatches, Peking, Jan. 21 and 24, 1955, and SCMP, 974, Jan. 22-26, 1955, pp. 31-32.

31. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

32. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

668 in the country, where economic opportunities
183 are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

668 The elite of the towns and cities are the
565 functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a daily calendar of meetings, a full briefcase, and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly disciplined, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas, and forced to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[33]

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33. Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

668 The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine, as the Communist plan, the new mores and patterns of living for society as a whole.

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53 to the arts. Therefore, as far as the theory and policy of the arts are concerned, no separate treatment is necessary.

No attempt is made in this chapter to describe the propaganda and information machine of the Chinese Communists in which literature and art are made to play their part. For this, consult the chapters on propaganda and information in this handbook.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITERARY ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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668 The reform of literature and art (wen-i cheng-feng) at Yenan in 1942[1] made the practice of literature and art in the Liberated Areas overt political activities; the application of the same line to the entire country in 1949 subjugated all writers and artists in the nation to the service

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1. Mao Tse-tung's speeches at the Party School in Yenan in February and at the Yenan Literary and Art Circles' meeting in May 1942 established the "line" of literature and art which had been endorsed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and which has since been upheld as the creed of writers and artists in Communist China. The general tenor of the speeches was that literary and art workers at Yenan, being undeniably "revolutionaries by choice," should stop the hitherto blind imitation of alien and imported

53 of the state. Control and regimentation of
668 thought in literature and art became more systematic as the Communists consolidated their power, the victor being the arbiter of artistic "truth." In general, the control over writers, artists, and their work takes three forms, as was true in the Liberated Areas after the 1942 reform: (1) the organization of writers and artists under government auspices; (2) the identification of the duties of the writers and artists with the implementation of government policy; and (3) the unceasing use of literary and

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prototypes and the singing of abstract, contentless tunes which had nothing to do with the revolution and which could not possibly be understood by the peasant-worker-soldier masses. In their place, fresh and lively revolutionary themes in the Chinese style would be appreciated by the masses. Although in principle Mao believed that Chinese literature and art should benefit from masterpieces of other cultures, especially those produced in the Soviet Union, in no instance would he allow the separation of Chinese literature and art from immediate revolutionary tasks; and on this basis, he puts the popularization of literature and art ahead of sophistication. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, Vol. 3, pp. 833-900.

53 art criticism to keep writers and artists in line.
668 Now, however, the scope is national.

538 A. The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles

In July 1949, before the establishment of the Central People's Government, writers and artists from various parts of China were "invited" to Peking where the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was organized to co-ordinate the activities of a number of the nationwide organizations in specific cultural fields, such as literature, art, music, and the cinema; it was to follow the line laid down by Mao Tse-tung in 1942. Theoretically, the federation is not a government body, but it sent delegates to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949, as did Communist-sponsored political factions and mass organizations. The chairman and vice-chairman of the federation were given posts in the Communist government.

At the organizational meeting in July, Chou En-lai told the gathered writers and artists that they were the representatives of 70,000 literary and art workers in China, of which 30,000 were in the People's Liberation Army, another 30,000 scattered in the old Liberated Areas, and the remaining 10,000 were in areas recently liberated from the Kuomintang. From Chou's statement it is obvious that he identified as writers and artists Party propaganda personnel and those workers

871 well trained veteran cadres to key positions on the administrative staff of the school, serve to maintain the Communists' control over the educational system.

III. MAJOR MOVEMENTS LAUNCHED BY COMMUNISTS IN EDUCATION

A. "Thought Reform"

668 871 To effect an ideological revolution among the educators and students is an essential step in the Communist plan to Sovietize completely the educational system in China. Since 1949, every major measure adopted by the Peking regime in the cultural and educational fields involves, either implicitly or explicitly, an effort to remold the thought of the people concerned. However, an organized drive to change the way of thinking of the educators and students did not start until Premier Chou En-lai delivered his speech on September 29, 1951. He urged the educators to abandon their attitude of "study for study's sake" or "art for art's sake" and to step down from their professorial pedestals to serve the masses. He exhorted the students to forget about personal profit and to identify their ambitions with the national interest.

This movement spread rapidly. Criticism and self-criticism were encouraged. "Petit bourgeois sentimentalism," "capitalistic romanticism," "feudalistic individualism," and a host of other "undesirable" attitudes were subject to

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relentless attack. During subsequent months the Communist press was crowded with signed confessions of past ideological errors. This is the mainstay of the Communist program to revamp education, but it is admittedly a most trying task, which requires a long-range plan and sustained effort for its achievement.

Although practically every college professor in China has published his self-criticism (some of them have done so several times) and every student has been through at least one "thought struggle," the movement continues unabated. The Ministry of Education in announcing the tasks for 1954 again pointed out the need for continued vigilance against the "remnant of feudalistic thought."[22] The Government Administration Council in directing secondary schools to improve their courses stressed the importance of strengthening socialist thought.[23] The latest revival of this issue occurred when the philosophy and works of Hu Shih, Yü P'ing-po, and Hu Feng became the subject of a purge.[24] (See chapter on Artistic and Intellectual Expression.)

B. Labor-education Movement

The labor-education movement is design-

22. People's Education, March 1954, p. 22.
23. Ibid., July 1954, p. 16.
24. Ibid., May 1955, p. 5.

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ed to inculcate a respect for labor in the minds of intellectuals and youth, and is not to be confused with "Reform-through-labor" discussed in the chapter on Forced Labor.

Beginning with the kindergarten, the Communists teach students to respect the "fruits of labor," to care for school property and to aid their parents by doing chores at home. Grade schools children are taught manual work, partly as physical exercise and partly as a means to cultivate respect for labor. Older students are urged to prepare themselves for work on the farm or in the factory. Such a preparation, the Communists say, is the "most glorious" assignment which can be offered "news China's" youth. Students in advanced schools are reminded of their duty to accept government assignments regardless of the working conditions involved. The main purpose of the labor-education movement is to prepare students for work upon the completion of any level of education.

"Study is the only task worth undertaking, and all other professions are beneath it" is a traditional Chinese expression which upholds the high social status of the educated. This has become a target of Communist attack, and the fight to change the minds of the people is still surging.[25]

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25. See Communist official directives on "labor-education," ibid., June 1954, p. 7; May 1954, p. 7.

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C. Physical Education Movement

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648 Although a specific commission has been established to promote physical education (see Chart 3), the State Council and the two ministries of education have been seriously concerned with the health of students. This concern originates from Mao Tse-tung's instructions to promote "good health, good study, and good work." As early as Spril 1951, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, called the attention of the nation's educators to the importance of guarding the health of students. Tung's declaration was affirmed by other officials in responsible positions during subsequent years, but apparently the situation was not much improved. The students remained in financial straits while the pressure of intensified courses was increased. The Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Commission on Physical Education issued in July 1954 a joint directive reiterating an earlier announcement by the Government Administration Council on "Decisions on Improving the Health of Students in Schools at All Levels."[26] However, it is obvious that stress on physical exercise alone cannot take the place of an adequate diet.

Other movements launched simultaneously with the above-mentioned drives have been revived from time to time. They are indicative of the ills plaguing the educational system under the

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26. People's Education, August 1954, p. 65.

871 Communists in China. Language reform, important to primary education and in efforts to combat 668 illiteracy, is associated with "thought reform". The program to establish winter schools, summer schools, and other special training classes for peasants, workers, and soldiers is actually a part of school reorganization. Some of the most important characteristics of these movements will be further discussed.

IV. THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF SCHOOLS

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The Communist policy for education and the movements in education are nationwide, and are subject to only minor regional variations. However, a survey of the schools in North China may reveal the extent to which the Communist policy has been carried out and the response of the people in this region.

A. Kindergarten and Primary Schools

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The development of kindergartens in North China has been tied in with the child welfare program, and there has not been any specific discussion among the educational circles. Reporting educational development in Peking in 1950, Deputy Mayor Wu Han only mentioned that kindergartens as a whole had undergone a process of reorganization with a view to improving their efficiency and bringing better personnel to these

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Hopei	12,120	28
Shansi	6,160	1

As these figures indicate, Buddhism in North China was far weaker than it was in the provinces of the Yangtze valley and further south.

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Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived until 1949 have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped, publishing houses closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists

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16. Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of the various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

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to reform and defend their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, the association will be used as a propaganda device to allay fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it will also be used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia and Tibet.[18] Domestically, the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counter-revolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

In the principal cities, especially those visited by delegations from Buddhist countries like Burma and Ceylon, a few temples are maintained for religious use. But the greatest number of temples have been converted for use

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18. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsü Yün have been chosen as honorary presidents of the Buddhist Association. Cf. Buddhism in China, Foreword. The same volume shows the effort of the Communists to make Peking again a center of Lamaistic Buddhism which prevails in Tibet and Mongolia.

19. Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

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by the state. One source,[20] admittedly strongly biased, asserts that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1, in Shanghai from 600 to 2, and in Hangchow from 300 to 1. Certain Buddhist monuments of historical and cultural importance are being restored and preserved.[21]

As we have pointed out, the clergy has been largely secularized. In Shanghai, as in other cities, monks have opened restaurants specializing in Buddhist dishes. Everywhere the clergy has converted temples into small factories in order to produce hand-made articles. Monks of the Fa-tsang temple in Shanghai now work on nearby farms, in Hangchow, some 1,800 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22]

There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the

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20. Atrocities.

21. Buddhism in China, introduction and plates.

22. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

779 668 Buddha's birthday.[23] But the general impression is that Buddhism is dying out. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed under the present regime. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

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23. New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddh." on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

24. The outstanding example is Chü Tsan, a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religious, and social work, the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü Tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. Chü Tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe in them.[26] The last "Heavenly Teacher" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiang-si by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[27] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yün-kuan at Peking, was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant. The Nationalist Government then confiscated the lands which had long supported the Po-yün-kuan.

Religious Taoism has not had the inspiration or the leadership to develop modern doctrines and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-15,[28] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by the development of any social, educational, or medical program. Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communists will complete this process. The Communists themselves recognize that "religious

26. Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

27. Ibid., p. 152.

28. Shina mondai jiten, [Encyclopedia of China Problems], Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

779 Taoism" is dead. In 1949, when bidding for the
771 support of religious groups, they invited repre-
• 668 sentatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but no representative of Taoism.[29]

779 Folk Taoism in the present study includes
771 all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors has steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy, and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshiped; in many villages the god of grain no longer has his altar.[30] One sample survey[31] showed that in the early 1930's, 58 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for

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29. Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

30. Cf. Chan, op. cit., p. 145, for an excellent summary of their development.

31. C.S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

779 their original purpose; the decline in the last
771 twenty-five years has been accelerated.

779 In the case of folk Taoism, the Communists
771 have moved to bring to an end a complex of an-
668 cient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this volume. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed 32 indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay away from local witch doctors and, when ill, to consult a physician. And they are warned not to believe in prayer to the images of some divinity, "for these are only of mud and lacquer." At all levels of education and in the annual cycles of "campaigns," such as the Patriotic Health Drive, and the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, reference is made to the false and debilitating character of the old beliefs, which are held to be "feudal," unscientific," "reactionary," etc. It is doubtful that the remnants of folk religion -- in recent years the resort only of the aged and the ignorant -- will long survive the campaigns being waged against them.

779 Another Taoist-linked institution is the
771 secret society. These organizations have
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32. Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [The Three-Character Classic for Women], Shanghai, Hsin-hua, 1950, passim.

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779 traditionally drawn their rituals, liturgies,
575 doctrines, and patron deities from religious and
668 folk Taoism. They have had a variety of social
771 and political functions: they provide, expecially in times of disorder, a closely knit confraternity from which the member can draw help and security. They offer a focus of social and religious life particularly appealing to those who travel beyond the limits of their local kinship groups. Throughout the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), many secret societies had a strong political function as a focus of anti-dynastic and anti-official sentiment and activity; they made a notable contribution to the victory of the republicans in 1911. Yet Sun Yat-sen found them unmanageable political allies, and by 1930 Chiang Kai-shek -- despite whatever support he may have derived from them in his seizure of power in 1927 -- began to campaign against them.[33] This was interrupted by his campaigns against the Communists and his preparations to resist the Japanese.

The Communist regime obviously will not tolerate any such closed, self-supporting, potentially subversive groups, and a series of campaigns has been carried out against them. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had withdrawn from these reactionary sects and societies

33. Cf. B. Favre, Les sociétés secrètes en Chine, Paris, 1933, p. 177.

779 and that the battle was essentially won."[34] That
575 his claims of victory were premature is sug-
• 668 gested by a recent report of the dissolution of
771 five secret society organizations in the vicinity of Kalgan. The report accused the societies of elaborate clandestine organizations, hidden headquarters, an elaborate hierarchy of leadership, and efforts to inflitrate Communist organizations.[35] (The societies' power of resistance is discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

Secret societies have been particularly numerous in North China.

The Pai-lien Chiao (White Lotus Society) has a long history. It was founded some seven hundred years ago and was then a focus of Chinese resistance to the Mongol invaders. In 1794, 1801, and 1813 its members rebelled against the Manchu dynasty. The society's areas of strength in modern times have been the provinces of Honan, Shantung, and Hopei. It has many branches, some of which will be considered separately below.[36]

The Hung-ch'iang Hui (Society of Redspears) an offshoot of the White Lotus Society, fought bandits, government troops, and warlord armies between 1916 and 1924. It was strong in Shansi,

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34. NCNA dispatch of Sept. 18, 1953, quoted in Walker, China Under Communism, p. 189.

35. NCNA, June 16, 1955; SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

36. Chan, op. cit., p. 158.

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Hopei, Shantung, Honan, and Anhwei, but its center of strength has since shifted to the south and southwest.[37]

The Tsai-li Hui (Principle Abiding Society) is often regarded as a branch of the White Lotus Society. Despite frequent persecution, it has remained strong, particularly in Hopei, Shantung, and Honan. Its public halls were to be found all over the north, especially in Tientsin and Peking. It attracted artisans and laborers, some farmers and merchants, and a small number of intellectuals.[38]

The Ko-lao Hui (Society of Elders) is somewhat more religious than other societies and has a history of resistance to government controls. Founded in Fukien, it has had important strength in Central and West China and in the North. It is "the most extensive, well-organized, and influential of China's secret societies."[39]

The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) was founded soon after the revolution of 1911, but it grew most rapidly after 1928. It gained strength and extended its activities throughout North China during the period of Japanese occupation.[40] Its central office was probably

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37. Ibid., p. 159.
38. Ibid., pp. 156-57.
39. Ibid., pp. 160,-61.
40. Ibid., pp. 166-67. Willem Grootaers, "Une société secrète moderne, I-koan Tao, bibliographie annotée," Folklore Studies, Vol. V, 1946, pp. 316-52.

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779 in Shantung, but its center of publication was in
575 Tientsin. The society was under severe pressure
668 from the Nationalist Government, which seized
771 two of its local headquarters and dispersed its members.[41] Nevertheless, it has survived. A Communist release on June 16, 1955, indicated that the society is still a disciplined and resourceful organization, at least in the Kalgan region.[42]

IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

779 This religion was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is in the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as both an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, see the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Modammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distrust, and governments in modern times have

41. Grootaers, op. cit., pp. 316, 351.
42. SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

779 learning born of religious conservatism.[50]

779 What have been Chinese Communist policies toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem • 668 that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas -- such as the North China Region -- where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The policies adopted towards centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have much in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association, which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation."[51] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are

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50. Ibid., pp. 198-205.

51. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

779 increasingly being given the prescribed Com-
• 668 munist education.

The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech by Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland." [53]

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52. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

53. NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

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668 The Chinese Communists' policy towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions" (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems[54] has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems." Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not understand Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

We have little reliable information on the Islamic communities of North China today. But some trends should be noted. The education of Islamic youth, although special Moslem schools have been set up by the government, will be in the pattern ordained by the government, and the youth will tend in time to become more Com-

54. Chinese Moslems, introduction.

779 668 munist than Moslem.[55] Secondly, the break-up of the closely knit urban and rural communities in North China will probably proceed apace. The Communist government boasts of the increasing number of Moslem youth now classified as "workers";[56] this means integration of the youth into new state-ordained patterns of activity in factories and workers organizations; it means that they will slowly be alienated from their parents' values as well as from their parents' occupational roles. Thirdly, as Moslems increasingly share in government and social activities, there will be less inclination on their part towards a defensive separatism; it is claimed, for example, that 72 Moslems have been deputies to Shanghai municipal and ch'ü congresses, and token participation tends to bring them into new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly been taken to provide for their special religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce initial suspicion and resist-

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55. A NCNA dispatch of June 9, 1955 states that there are five primary and one middle school for Moslems in Shanghai and that 90 per cent of the students have received free or reduced tuition. SCMP, 1068, Jan. 14, 1955, p. 35.

56. NCNA, Peking, June 10, 1955' SCMP, 1067, p 23. The claim is made that of the Moslems of Paoting, Hopei Province, the percentage of workers' families has risen from 14% to 33.3% in 1955.

57. SCMP, 1068, p. 35.

58. Ibid.

779 ance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The Moslems of North 668 China do not have the relative safety in numbers possessed by the large Islamic communities in the southwest and the northwest. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance rapidly in this area. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre, backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

779 The older of the two Christian faiths in China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack because of its foreign support and its allegiance to Rome. The church has countered these attacks in a variety of ways: it has encouraged the Sinicization of Church symbols, e.g., the Virgin is portrayed as a Chinese woman in Chinese dress; it has given its foreign missionaries a more thorough grounding in Chinese language and culture, so that the best of them, wearing Chinese scholars' gowns as habits, speaking excellent Chinese, can make their way successfully in any stratum of Chinese society. The most

779 discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied
797 areas than did the Catholics. Yet the more clearheaded of the Protestants could not but dread the rise of Communist power.

779 The timetable of Communist moves against
668 Protestants and their organizations follows approximately that for the Catholics noted above. The "national church," the "three autonomies," the confiscation of church property, church schools and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. There was a gradual decrease in the number of Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[81] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have been forced to accept the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectariansim, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. The " three autonomies" -- in support, government and propagation -- has

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81. The first figure is from the Handbook of the Christian Movement, reproduced in Dam boriena, p. 82. The other figures are from Walker, op. cit., p. 19.

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668 been a stated goal of Chinese Protestantism since 1851, and the Chinese Protestant community has generally accepted this as a praise-worthy end.[82] A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore, there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) a "grand union of the churches;" (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism-Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[83] Chinese Protestants are under a barrage of such statements, which even go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against the Romans.[84] How successfully Chinese Protestants as a whole are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist regime is unknown. Again, as in the

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82. Lacy, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

83. Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1050, p. 3.

84. Hsü, op. cit., p. 41.

779 case of the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to
• 668 the Communist "religion" would mean that the future of China is dark indeed.

The North China Region had the following distribution of Protestants.[85]

Province	Population (Million) (1938)	Percentage of Protestants (1938)	Number of Protestants (1924)
Hopei	31.1	6.4	22,283
Shansi	12.0	2.4	8,340

The tendency for Protestantism to have its greatest strength in the accessible coastal provinces has persisted until today. In terms of social composition, the Protestant community has been estimated as 75 per cent rural and 25 per cent urban, with farmers predominating and a lesser number of petty merchants and workers.[86]

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85. Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis, XI, 1938, pp. 272-81. Tables reproduced in Damboriena, pp. 90-91. The 1924 figures are from the China Yearbook, 1924. Ku's percentages seem unduly high in relation to the total known communicants.

86. Percentage estimates by the Dean of the University of Nanking as of the early 1930's. Damboriena, p. 30.

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668 Peking has been second only to Shanghai as a center of Protestant religious and educational work. Here were two of the most impressive institutions which the Protestants had built: Peking Union Medical College and Yenching University. Here too were important missionary centers, hospitals, and institutes for social work. The major institutions have been taken over by the Communist state, but it would appear that churches are still holding regular services. We have no direct reports on Peking, but a Chinese Protestant alleged that some 140 Protestant churches in Shanghai were holding services every Sunday.[87] The same source makes much of the fact that the Chinese Protestant sects are taking over their own missionary activities -- one of the "three autonomies." He further states that nearly 200 students have been enrolled in divinity schools in both Nanking and Peking.[88]

The future of Protestantism is uncertain. The key to its survival is whether, within the strict limits imposed by the new Communist-Nationalist orthodoxy, a Christian church can

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87. Yao-tsung Wu, "Freedom of Religious Belief in a Prosperous and Strong Fatherland," Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, Oct. 1, 1955; SCMP, 1159, Oct. 28, 1955, p. 41. A high level of church attendance in Shanghai is confirmed by accounts of British evacuees. Cf. New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, p. 32.

88. Wu, loc. cit.

779 win over a significant number of the youth.
668 Christianity is continually castigated in education and in the press as backward, superstitious and unscientific. The rewards of place and prestige go to those Chinese most fervent in their acceptance of the Communisty orthodoxy. It is doubtful if a significant number of youth will act to cut themselves off from these rewards by embracing an alien religion.

IV. THE PATRIOTIC HEALTH DRIVE

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During the conflict in Korea, the Chinese Communists accused the United States of waging bacteriological warfare. The Communists said it began in Korea on January 28, 1952 and later spread to Northeast China.[14] Obviously this theme was utilized to strengthen the mass feeling against America and to integrate the health drive with propaganda. The Patriotic Health Drive was launched in February as part of the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and it proved to be so economical to the government and became so successful that it was made an annual affair. In the name of patriotism, the people in the cities and rural areas were asked to contribute free labor for the improvement of general hygiene.

In the national capital, Peking, the entire population was mobilized, with a leader for every ten households. By September 1952, Communists claimed, there were "practically no" flies and mosquitos in Peking.[15] As a matter of fact, the

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14. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, April 25, 1952, p. 1.

15. Enlightenment Daily, Sept., 19, 1952, p. 3.

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668 municipal government of Peking had been engaged in projects of health improvement since 1950. Piped water reached all the inhabitants in the city limits, whereas only one third of the people had received it prior to that time.[16] Many open ditches, where insects bred and spread disease, were covered and replaced by underground sewage pipes. Because only one per cent of the households had modern flush toilets,[17] more sanitary equipment and a better system of collecting feces were ordered. Within eighteen days of the launching of the Patriotic Health Drive on March 16, 1952, it was claimed, 90 per cent of the population was participating in the "big clean up" with the following results:

Refuse removed	some 13,000,000 cubic feet
Weeds removed	530,000 cubic feet
Open sewage cleaned	37,000 feet
Bodies of stagnant water dredged	5,033
Rat holes sealed up	347,938
Tree holes sealed up	32,780

By May 14, the report said, 17,890,000 fly larvae, 3,400,000 flies, and 190,000 rats had been exterminated. Glass or screen covers were

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16. Ibid.
17. People's Daily, June 27, 1952, p. 3.

744 •668 required for all food peddled by vendors or displayed in markets. Some slaughterhouses and fecal drying yards were moved to more suitable locations outside the city limits. [18]

The Patriotic Health Drive in Tientsin began with propaganda early in 1952. [19] From the middle of April, the drive concentrated upon the improvement of sanitation. Statistics collected in May 1952 claimed that 80 per cent of the population had participated in the clean-up campaign, and that specific jobs were undertaken by 210,000 people of all professions with the following results:

Refuse cleaned up	some 200,000 cubic feet
Bodies of stagnant water filled up or disinfected	1,994
Rat holes sealed up	410,000
Tree holes sealed up	10,149
Public comfort stations built	491
Fecal drying yards removed	428

A system of food control was set up to require the registration of food vendors, and food manufacturers were required to submit their products to the municipal Bureau of Public Health for analysis. In mid-June, the Patriotic Health Drive in Tientsin entered a new phase -- mobilization for the extermination of mosquitoes.

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18. Chief-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], June 7, 1952, p. 3.

19. People's Daily, June 28, 1952, p. 3.

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• 668 The lack of information and publicity about the Patriotic Health Drive in the smaller cities and rural areas in North China leads to the conjecture that the drive either did not do so well or was not so strongly promoted as in the two municipalities. More time and further investigation of source material than this survey permits would be necessary to bear out this surmise. But this belief can be at least partly substantiated by occasional reports. One traveler reported that the people of Ch'ang-hsin-tien did not pay much attention to sanitation work in response to the call of the Patriotic Health Drive. The streets were dirty and there were many flies. Yet Ch'ang-hsin-tien is only about twelve miles southwest of Peking, on the Peking Hankow Railway. Another report of a similar nature came from Ching-hsing, a coal mining district also in Hopei Province, which mentioned that refuse and water-melon rinds were scattered everywhere and flies and mosquitoes were numerous.[20]

V. PEIPING UNION MEDICAL COLLEGE HOSPITAL

743 In 1950, a few months after the outbreak of warfare in Korea, the Communist Government in Peking passed an act to take over all the cultural, educational, relief, and religious

20. Kung-fei Ti Wei-sheng I-yao Kung-tso [Health and Medical Works of the Chinese Communists], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, pp. 14-15.

743 known for its beauty and as a center of culture, the Communists seem determined to maintain Peking as a showplace. In its western suburb, a "city of learning" has been erected, and on its eastern outskirts an industrial area has been developed.] It was claimed in 1953 that construction had begun[31] on twenty hospitals, clinic s, and sanatoriums, including a Moslem Hospital for that minority group, a children's hospital with 600 beds (claimed to be the largest of its kind in China), the Soviet Red Cross Hospital, and a sanatorium for Asian students. The Soviet Red Cross Hospital was said to be a gift from the Soviet people to China and was to be ultra-modern in equipment,[32] supported by Soviet money, and staffed by Soviet personnel. The Asian Students' Sanatorium,[33] with 300 beds, was formally opened on November 17, 1954, and may have been a gesture to impress Asiatic peoples.

744 668 Writers and artists have been enlisted to help spread government propaganda pertaining to improved health conditions by the Communist regime in Peking. For instance, Lao She, the well-known author of Rickshaw Boy, wrote a three-act play entitled The Dragon Beard

31. "Half a New City in Five Years," China Reconstructs, Peking, China Welfare Institute, Sept.-Oct., 1954, pp. 6-9.

32. People's Daily, June 20, 1952, p. 1.

33. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 962, pp. 25-6.

744 Ditch, first published in 1951, using Peking as
668 its setting and improvement of sanitation as its subject. The Dragon Beard Ditch is in a slum district behind the Temple of Heaven. The open ditch served as a sewer and had been a menace to health for centuries. Between May and September 1950, the open ditch was eliminated and replaced by five miles of concrete conduits. The inhabitants of the area also had piped water for the first time.[34] The play is reported to have been very well received and staged many times, and its production helped to publicize achievements in health and sanitation in Peking.

744 The health of a people depends on many factors. Mere preventive medical care, and the killing of flies and mosquitoes, etc., do not necessarily present a complete picture of improved health conditions. Malnutrition and undue mental strain may offset whatever good has been done by vaccinations and inoculations. Furthermore, when there is a shortage of food facing the people, many of the health programs of the Chinese Communists seem to be missing the most important problems. There are famines and man-made food scarcity situations on the mainland of China. This is particularly true since 1953, after the inauguration of the

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34. Li Te-chuan, "Health for All the People," China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1952, pp. 14-20.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2c,
Political Background

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

Political dynamics, which deals with political power and political processes, has a special meaning when applied to Communist China. It is intelligible only when it is realized that the Communist Party of China is dedicated to the concentration of power in its own hands. Not only does the political process in Communist China follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party, but also the will of society itself is manipulate by the Party through the stimulation of people's enthusiasm and support. Hence, the study of political dynamics in the North China Region should examine the regional Communist Party itself, its political control, and the elections and politics of minor parties.

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The Communist Party in this region concerns itself with the maintenance of an efficient and militant Party organization which exercises its control over all types of organization. Through its well-established network of control, popular enthusiasm is aroused and the political activities of the region are regulated. The two chief means employed are the injection of issues and the

665 initiation of movements or campaigns. While
•668 issues are employed to capture popular attention and to agitate emotion in preparation for ensuing campaigns, movements are the means to achieve assigned goals.

Initiated by the Party,[1] a campaign calls for the concerted action among all Party organizations at all levels. A campaign is not merely a method of executing a mission, it is also a device to test the efficiency of all organs, and a means of eliminating the undesirable ones. A campaign can be either of national or local nature;[2] it may be directed toward either the population as a whole or only a segment of it. In the Communist context, a campaign should be regarded as a political device, rather than as a manifestation of political or social process.

665 The concentration of both government and Party functions is the second factor determining the pattern of political dynamics in the North China Region. Four major means are used by the

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1. For a discussion of campaigns, see: Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100. W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China, Cambridge, 1955, pp. 72-98.

2. Typical drives of a local nature are conducted in farming communities: Spring Plowing, Summer Collection, Resist Drought, Resist Flood, Autumn Harvest, and many others.

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665 1. The Party and the Corps: The relation-
668 ship of the Party is such that the Corps submits completely to the Party. The constitution of the Corps assures the Party of effective control by providing that Party members shall take charge of Corps organs above the county level[32] and that Corps activity at all levels shall be under the direction of Party Committees. Indeed, the New Democratic Youth Corps is the lieutenant of the Party. Its first function is to provide a reservoir of potential Party members. For example, among the Corps members in the province of Hopei in October 1950, 18,590 had become Party members.[33] To supply personnel for duties in all organizations is another obligation of the Corps to the Party. The Corps membership in Hopei province, for example, stood at 269,267 in May 1950 with 13,092 Corps branches established in all organizations.[34] The final task of the Corps is to engage in the broadest possible range of activities so as to reach all sections of society, where Party organizations are lacking. Corps organizations have existed in North China Region since 1946, While Corps members actively participated in underground youth movements in the cities, others took part in all activities in the countryside. The Peking Youth Corps, for example, was organized from the underground youth organizations. Workers in the city no doubt formed the other force for the Peking Corps set-up.

2. Organization. Organizationally, the Corp

32. Chinese text of Constitution of New Democratic Youth Corps, ibid., July 7, 1953, p. 3.

33. Hopei Daily, Oct. 6, 1950, p. 1.

34. Ibid, May 4, 1950, p. 1.

in the North China Region follows that of the Party. 665
The Central Committee of the Youth Corps was 668
represented by the North China Working Committee
until its abolition in August 1954. Local Corps
organs are established at the provincial, municipal,
and county level. The Local Corps Committees
are empowered to organize and to assign repre-
sentative working committees to administrative
districts and ch'ü.

With the exception of those working committees at district and ch'ü levels, the constituent Corps organs rest upon a dual authority. At each level there is a congress and a committee elected by it. These committees are the executive organs of the Corps at each level, and are responsible to both the congress of the corresponding level and the committe at the next higher level. In the Peking Corps committee,[35] eight departments and commissions were found in March 1950. They included departments of Organization, Propaganda, Youth Worker, University Affairs, High School Affairs, Young Pioneers, and Commissions on Suburb Workers and Peking Government Organs.

Like the Party, Corps organizations can also be established on functional bases. Such organizations are known as Corps branches, which can be formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village government office, company of the Army, school, or street where there are three or more Corps members. A general Corps branch and

35. People's Daily, March 5, 1950, p. 4.

665 and Corps Committee can also be formed when
668 the size of the branch is large enough to warrant it. Corps branches can also be broken down to teams and groups whenever necessary. These basic level organs of the Corps not only serve to agitate and mobilize youth and the masses, but they also act as a substitute organ for the Party hwere Party organs are lacking.

B. The Young Pioneers.

665 The Young Pioneers as an organization com-
857 prising youth between the ages of 9 and 15 years
668 is entrusted to the leadership of the New Democratic Youth Corps. In the North China region the Pioneers claimed a membership of 16,000 as early as June 1950. The theme of the Young Pioneers was originally centered on patriotism. Since 1953, emphasis has shifted to cultural training and to further expansion. National membership was[36] given in March 1955 at 70 millions, about 15 per cent of the nation's youth in that age group.

SECTION TWO: POLITICAL CONTROL

665 The Communist Party exercises its political control in the North China Region through a network of controls, not limited to the Party organs alone, but which extend to government, industrial and mass organizations. This control is insured by placing Communist Party members in key positions in those organizations, by reserving for the Party all policy-making power, and by agitation and mobilization of various political and social forces.

36. Ibid., January 31, 1950, p. 3.

665 the activists in the city. The Communist Party's
562 attempt to organize women factory workers was also assiduous. As of October 1950, 54 per cent of the women workers in Hopei had joined trade unions; in cities like Paoting and Shihchiachuang, the percentage went up to 90 per cent.[49] In other fields of activity, women's participation was also high. As of March 1950, 4,470 women cadre also worked in government agencies in Hopei. Their participation in the People's courts was particularly great. Twelve per cent of the presidents of People's courts in Shansi were women.

665 D. Other Mass Organizations. There are in
668 the North China Region a number of other mass organizations with a strong influence on society. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth has its representative offices in all key cities of this region. Its Tientsin office,[50] for example, was organized in January 1950. Branches of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles were also organized in all cities. However, the most popular organization among them all is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Its Hopei branch[51] was officially organized in November 1950 with a membership of 350,000. In the North China Region as a whole,[52] the membership stood at 1,908,202 in April 1951, the highest of any region at that time.

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49. Hopei Daily, October 31, 1950, p. 2.
50. People's Daily, January 10, 1950, p.3.
51. Hopei Daily, Nov. 7, 1950, p. 1.
52. Ibid., April 15, 1951, p. 1.

423 They included land reform "experts" from the
665 old liberated" areas, students, and workers from mass organizations. The land reform team of 469 serving in the suburbs of Peking,[55] for example included 135 such "experts." Another feature of the land reform in the North China region was the lenient policy adopted. For example, the establishment of people's tribunals was discouraged and their use was carefully handled so as not to avoid terror among the populace. This lenient policy was deemed necessary because of the proximity of this region to the national capital and of the large number of minority groups in this region.

During the land reform, power centers in the rural areas remained: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasant Associations, (3) the hsiang government, and (4) the militia. Of these four, the Peasant Association and the militia were of special importance.

413 The Peasant Association was the executive
668 agent of the land reform. It possessed the power
665 to decide all important questions relating to land reform. It was an organization primarily of poor peasants, who constituted two-thirds of the membership; the other one-third was filled by middle peasants. Prior to the active execution of the land reform, Communists attempted to include all poor and middle peasants in the Peasant Association and the membership was large. In Shansi province, it stood at 200,000; in the county

55. People's Daily, Nov. 23, 1950, p. 2.

668 423 665 of Yü-tsi 80 per cent of the peasants were members of the Peasant Association.[56]

665 423 701 The militia served as another instrument of terror at the disposal of the Party. It is an organization of poor peasants and farm laborers (67 per cent) and of youth (aged 18-30) and is strongly class-conscious.

At the end of the land reform in North China,[57] the militia's strength was placed at 2,371,900. In Shansi Province alone, it was 373,250 in November 1950. Needless to say, the militia in this region had participated in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and later assisted the Communists to defeat the Nationalists. They were well-organized and had gone through several consolidations and readjustments. In addition to the normal duties assigned to the militia, such as guarding granaries, bridges and transportation centers and escorting food transportation, the militia was also expected to assist in coastal defense. In most cases, they were organized into teams, such as highway patrol groups, coastal defense squads, and village joint-defense teams. In the Paoting administrative district, 665 such village teams were organized among the 4,715 villages.[58]

665 623 2. Election of Ts'un (village) Peoples' Representative Conference and Political Consolidation in the "old liberated" areas. The election of

56. Ibid., April 24, 1950, p. 2.
57 Ibid., Oct. 25, 1950, p. 1.
58 Hopei Daily, August 1, p. 3.

687 concommitants of excessive control by an extremely centralized state, though little explicit reference is made to such feelings by the regime.[1]

I. SUPPRESSION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES

• 668 The term "counterrevolutionaries" as used by the Communists is only vaguely defined. It includes all persons whose past or present actions are deemed contrary to the purpose and interests of the Communists, particularly "bandits," landlords, armed resistance groups, spies, saboteurs, secret societies, and unrepentant former Nationalist Government officials, army officers, and members of the Kuomintang. The suppression of counterrevolutionaries in the North China Region followed the same pattern as in other regions. However, due largely to the nature and limited scope of the resistance, Communist measures in North China were less violent than usual and were used chiefly for psychological effect. Since the reported increase of criminal activities in the North China Region in 1954, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries has again become one of the immediate tasks of the Communist organizations there.

A. Extermination of "Bandits"

Prior to 1952, the term "bandits" applied

1. Studies of USSR can be helpful in understanding this subject. Cf. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 1953; Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard U. Press, 1954.

668 only to remnants of the Nationalist Government forces on the Mainland and the long-active bands of robbers. Since then, it has been used broadly to identify all anti-social and subversive groups.

727 669 Remnants of the Nationalist Government forces gave the Communists little trouble in the North China Region. Their organized resistance ceased as soon as peace was declared in the region after the capture of Peking on January 31, 1949. According to a Communist report, the surrender of the city by its Nationalist commander Fu Tso-i put out of action a quarter of a million Nationalist troops.[2] In the same month, a total of 628,000 troops went over to the Communists in the North China Region. About half of these captured soldiers were reorganized into Communist units,[3] and the rest were discharged and ordered to their homes. Many of the discharged troops who had not reached home before the complete conquest of the Mainland were recaptured. Non-natives of North China remaining in the region were detained for rehabilitation or forced labor. In Peking, an estimated 15,770 former Nationalist servicemen were arrested.[4]

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2. Ti San-ts'u Kuo-nei Ko-ming Chan-cheng [Brief Summary of the Third National Revolutionary War], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 140-41.

3. Ibid., p. 218.

4. Report of P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Jan. 31, 1950.

565 the system of agricultural producers' co-operatives. In December 1954, renewed warnings
423 against them were voiced by the Communists.
687 The case of Ch'ang-li hsien was cited. According to the report, former landlords, aided by the "new rich," had succeeded in infiltrating a producers' co-operative in order to destroy it. Having become members of the co-operative, the "counterrevolutionaries" bribed Party cadres and employed collaborators to capture key positions in the organization. They spread rumors and created dissension in an effort to disorganize the co-operative. The Communists accused members of the co-operative of showing contempt for the poor peasants by inviting "rich peasants" to join. (Regulations forbid the acceptance of landlords and "rich peasants" as members of the co-operatives.) Landlords were charged with creating unrest in the rural areas, burning granaries, killing cattle, murdering Communist members, and destroying dams and agricultural implements owned by the co-operatives.

C. Suppression of Nationalist Elements and Espionage Activities

668 The suppression of counterrevolutionaries in North China at first was carried out under joint direction of the Government Administration Council and the People's Supreme Court.[8]

7. Ibid., Dec. 15, 1954, p. 1.

8. Report on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in Hopei Province, Ho-pei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily], Oct. 30, 1950, p. 1.

668 Originally, the responsibility for suppression rested upon the public security agencies, the military control committees in the cities, and the People's courts, but the suppression of counterrevolutionaries became a nationwide movement in 1951, engendering mass participation and employing the most ruthless tactics to accomplish its avowed purpose. Upon the conclusion of the movement, the foundation was laid for the construction of a network of mass security organizations.

1. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement of 1951.

The movement was an attempt to implement the process of suppression and to gain both physical and psychological control of the people. The use of force was common and the employment of intimidation and terrorism was far-reaching. At a session of the All-Circle Municipal and Ch'ü Representatives' Conference (enlarged) at Peking in May 1951, some 505 counterrevolutionaries were sentenced by Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of the Peking Municipal Public Security Bureau and concurrently Minister of Public Security of the Central People's Government.[9] Almost half (221) of the counterrevolutionaries were executed. Among them were ex-officials who had served with the Japanese-supported puppet government during the war against Japan, former Nationalist officers and intelligence workers, local "despots," "bandit" leaders, and leaders of secret

9. Report made by Lo Jui-ch'ing, People's Daily, May 22, 1951, p. 1.

668 societies. In addition to the 47 who were imprisoned but received stays of execution, 237 counterrevolutionaries were sentenced to forced labor camps.

The organization of mass meetings at which wholesale accusations were made was one of the familiar techniques of Communist terror tactics.[10] According to a report made by the Municipal Public Security Bureau, in Peking alone up to October 1951 some 29,626 mass meetings were held, involving the participation of nearly 3,379,000 people. In Tientsin, from March to July 1951, 2,200,000 people participated in more than 21,400 mass meetings, at which 3,693 people brought accusations against individuals or groups. The writing of letters of accusation was also encouraged by the Communist regime; in a period of two months in 1951, 1,967 letters of accusation were received by the authorities in Tientsin.[11] Mass participation was encouraged by the selection of "activists: who constituted the main force for the establishment of vast security networks among the populace and within all state and industrial organizations. Tientsin in October 1951 was reported to have 12,468 activists[12]

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10. Repor made by Lo Jui-ch'ing, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 1.

11. Ibid., June 5, 1951, p. 1.

12. Ibid., June 16, 1951, p. 1.

•668 Although the Communists optimistically declared the conclusion of the 1951 movement in the North China Region, counterrevolutionary activities did not cease after that year. Repeated warnings calling for suppression have been issued since 1954. The convention of the Second Session of the National People's Congress in July-August 1955 again affirmed the Communists' determination to renew the campaign against counterrevolutionaries. Shih Liang, Minister of Justice, reported in a speech to the Congress that the number of cases of counterrevolutionary activity was increasing.[13] During [674] 1954, counterrevolutionary cases constituted only 1.5 per cent of all criminal cases; in 1955 they were estimated at 4.8 per cent.

668 727 2. Former Nationalist Troops and Armed Resistance. The large-scale surrender of Nationalist troops in the North China Region eliminated many organized resistance groups. Either through imprisonment or reorganization, the Communists succeeded in establishing control over the large majority of former Nationalist servicemen. In Peking, in the year following the Communists' seizure of power, some 743 former Nationalist officials were arrested, 6,425 were forced to register, and 15,770 soldiers were placed in custody.[14]

669 Although organized resistance was not offered by Nationalist troops, their activities

13. Text of speech, ibid, July 30, 1955, p.6.
14. Ibid., Jan. 31, 1950, p. 1.

708 for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries,
669 the Communist regime apparently concentrated on the exposure and extermination of Nationalist intelligence networks. In Peking, for example, within a period of nineteen months, 179 cases involving espionage were prosecuted.[17] Among the 1,565 intelligence workers arrested were reported to be representatives of practically every intelligence organization within the Nationalist Party. In Shihchiachuang, Hopei Province, the Communists announced the discovery of a major intelligence organization, the Kung-chiao Pao-kuo-t'uan, and charged it with engaging in espionage against the regime.[18] Of the organization's personnel captured, only a few were accused of being leaders; one of them was charged with executing 160 underground Communist Party members. The elimination of other Nationalist intelligence teams in cities and rural areas was announced at this time.

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668 Although the majority of former Nationalist intelligence woekres was arrested, Kuomintang officials and army officers above the rank of captain were placed under surveillance and required to register with public security agencies in 1951. At one time, 392 former intelligence workers and 3,430 Kuomintang Party members above the rank of ch'ü secretary in Peking were placed under surveillance.[19]

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17. Hopei Daily, Oct. 2, 1950, p. 1.
18. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao (Yangtze Daily), Oct. 22, 1950, p. 4.
19. Hopei Daily, Oct. 21, 1950, p. 1.

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668 The nationwide movement for suppression of counterrevolutionaries in 1951 further intensified the Communists' campaign against spies. However, at the end of the campaign, the Communists admitted that only a minimum number of the cases prosecuted during the counterrevolutionary drive directly involved espionage. Most of the persons condemned were found guilty of being bandits of "despots."[20]

With the increase in counterrevolutionary activities on the China Mainland, espionage once again became one of the targets for suppression. Any "destructive act" resulting in the loss of state property and personnel was deemed an act of espionage. In 1954, according to Lo Jui-ch'ing,[21] 619 espionage cases were prosecuted in the nation as a whole. Cases involving the murder of Communist Party members and the transmittal of information to the Nationalist forces on Formosa were widely reported. The manager of the Wu-ta Trading Company at Tientsin was charged with espionage for allegedly supplying military and industrial information to Nationalist agents in Hong Kong.

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648 4. Foreign "Intelligence Agents." The suppression of foreign "intelligence agents"

20. Report of Lo Jui-ch'ing, People's Daily, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

21. Text of Lo's speech, ibid., July 29, 1955, p. 3.

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668 was as important as the liquidation of Nationalist spies. During 1951, church groups and foreign missionaries were accused of engaging in espionage, Mass meetings were held and anti-imperialism" propaganda was disseminated. An Italian, Antonio Riva, was arrested in Peking and charged with spying for the United States Government.[22] A militant Catholic organization in Tientsin known as Sheng-mu Chün (the Legion of Mary) was singled out for suppression.[23] Members of that organization were required to register and were subject to investigation by security agencies. Of the reported 20,000 Chinese Catholics in Peking, about 2 000 were said to have joined the Sheng-mu Chün and "other reactionary organizations."[24]

687 668 5. Sabotage. Sabotage cases involving the destruction of factory property, the theft of confidential information, and rumor-mongering were frequently reported in the North China Region. During 1950-52, acts of sabotage were fought by the enforcement of union control and by the organization of security committees in the factories and "safety" teams in the individual shops. With the launching of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953, regulations on safety and labor discipline were strengthened.[25] To observe labor

22. Ibid., Aug. 18, 1951, p. 3.

23. Text of order of Tientsin Military Control Committee, ibid., July 15, 1951, p. 1.

24. Ibid., Nov. 25, 1951, p. 4.

25. Text of "regulations on Labor Discipline Applied in State-Owned Enterprises," ibid., July 14, 1954, p. 2.

668 687 regulations, to guard state property, to safeguard economic information, and to observe all safety and security regulations became the duties of every worker.

687 Despite the enforcement of all these measures, sabotage activities grew with the expansion of industry. The woman minister of justice Shih Liang revealed that there were a total of 364,604 sabotage cases throughout China between January 1954 and May 1955. The destruction of the Hsia Hua Yüan mining area in Hopei in 1955 was cited as a deliberate act of sabotage by counterrevolutionaries.[26] The total number of sabotage cases in Hopei Province in 1954 was reported[27] to be approximately 160 per cent above the number reported in 1953. In Shansi, in 1954, sabotage rate doubled in the course of a year.

D. Secret Societies

669 575 The most widespread and persistent resistance to the Communist regime in the North China Region was offered by the secret societies. Secret societies, as rebellious organizations, have invariably represented the Chinese people's resistance to social change. Moreover, in a society such as exists in Communist China today, where the individual has lost all sense of identity, the appeal of secret societies which preach stoicism and indifference may be great, especially among the illiterate peasants and workers. For this reason, the Communists have singled out

26. Ibid., Jul.3,1955,p. 1.

27. Shih Liang's report ibid., Jul.30, 1955, p. 6.

669 these raids they seized many secret meeting
575 places capable of holding several hundred people and that weapons and other implements intended for espionage purposes were confiscated. During 1951, at least one self-styled "emperor" and many officers were arrested.

668 Apart from the issuance of orders to
575 outlaw secret societies, their suppression involved mass participation in public meetings, at which evidence of crimes committed by the societies was displayed and people were urged to reveal knowledge of membership and the activities in which the societies were involved. Many leaders were captured as a result of these mass demonstrations. Another method employed by the Communists involved a concentrated attack upon all labor organizations suspected of being under the influence or control of the secret societies. The societies had acquired leadership of the labor groups in charge of wharves, railway stations, and wheelbarrow "transportation centers." To eliminate the power of the societies, the Communists launch a campaign to reorganize small transport firms into state-owned companies and to organize workers into Communist trade unions under the disciplined management of Party cadres.

68 II. CORRUPTION, WASTE, AND THEFT

A. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns

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The launching of the Three-Anti Campaign against waste, corruption, and bureaucracy and the Five-Anti Campaign against bribery of government personnel, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and the purchase of economic information did more than affirm the Communists' determination to eliminate corruption and the most common causes of "degeneration" within the Party, state organizations, public enterprises, and private business firms; the campaigns also enabled the Communist leadership to tighten its grip on private enterprise, heighten discipline throughout the Party and public organizations, and exert closer surveillance and control over the whole state apparatus. These two campaigns were ruthlessly pursued with considerable impact upon society in the North China Region. The Three-Anti Campaign was directed at administrative and Party personnel, and the Five-Anti Campaign was directed at merchants and industrialists. Since Party members were, in most cases, administrative officers, the effect of the campaigns upon Party and administrative organizations was great, and since state-operated enterprises and administrative organizations were involved with private business, the attack upon business also was felt by administrators and Party members.

Both campaigns were conducted under the close supervision of the Central People's Government. Within all organizations at the regional level, a single pattern for suppression was utilized.[33]

33. Report of Three-Anti Campaign, People's Daily, Mar. 29, 1951, p. 1.

668 From December 1950 to January 1951, propaganda was directed at the populace as a whole; 80 per cent of the cases involving "corrupt officials" were said to have been uncovered as the result of accusations made during mass meetings. During January, a so-called "democratic inspection" was held. Under the direct command of the head of each department, teams were organized to conduct inspections of such matters as finance, housing, meals for workers, medical supplies, and administrative efficiency. During February and March, the "democratic inspection" was followed by concentrated attacks upon concealed corruption and the "big tigers" who were accused of misdeeds involving amounts above one billion yuan. The last two months of the campaign were devoted to the prosecution of the cases uncovered and the necessary reorganization which followed.

The Five-Anti Campaign was launched with the same speed and vigor. The campaign was broadened to include all business firms and the populace as a whole, and again mass participation was encouraged. By the end of January 1952, an estimate 110,000 accusations and confessions, involving some 30,000 business firms, were reported to have reached the Municipal Public Security Bureau in Peking.[34] At about the same time in Tientsin, an estimated 160,000 accusations were made against business firms in that area.

During the six months of the campaign, thousands of cases were exposed and many people were imprisoned and executed. The cases exposed

34. Ibid., Jan. 29, 1952, p. 1.

668 involved, in the main, misuse of government funds, corruption, and lavish use of public funds for personal luxuries.

B. Corruption

663 668 Immediately after the launching of the Three-Anti Campaign, corruption involving the first secretary of the Tientsin administrative district and his predecessor was revealed.[36] Not only did this case receive the widest coverage in newspapers throughout the region, but the stern language the Party chose to use on this occasion served as a warning to both government and Party workers who might be tempted to similar defiance of the regime. Both men had served the Party for at least twenty years. They were accused of embezzling official funds in the amount of 155 million yuan -- money intended for relief funds and the wages of workers drafted for flood control projects. The two secretaries were also charged with collaborating with businessmen for personal profit. Tried before a special tribunal of the Hopei People's High Court, they were executed a month later.

The day following the announcement of this case, 576 people confessed to corruption in the Peking Railway Sub-Bureau.[37] A few days later, 17 employees of the Department of Communications of the Shansi Provincial Government were accused of embezzling 8 billion yuan.[38] Li Chin-wu, commandant of the Motor Transportation School of the North China Military Command, was accused

36. Ibid., Dec. 30, 1951, p. 1.
37. Ibid., Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1.
38. Ibid., Jan. 23, 1952, p. 2.

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of accepting bribes from businessmen to cheat the government on contracts.[39] Similar charges were made against many government employees throughout the region. During the campaign against the "big tigers," many major cases were uncovered. In the Ch'a-nan administrative district of Chahar Province, 70 high-ranking officials were prosecuted, each accused of embezzling amounts above one billion yuan; in Yang-yuan county in the same province, 28 government employees were arrested.[40]

During the Five-Anti Campaign, many business men were the targets of prosecution. Liu Yüan-ching, chairman of the Contractors' Union of Peking, was charged with the theft of state property amounting to 80 billion yuan.[41] Fifteen manufacturers in Tientsin were charged with falsifying government contracts;[42] one individual was said to have made a profit of 260,000,000 yuan. The crimes most often committed by businessmen were the bribery of government personnel and failure to maintain the standards set for government contracts. Of the fifteen firms accused, the majority had resorted to bribery or had furnished the government with below-standard merchandise.[43] However, there is ample evidence

39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., Feb. 8, 1952, p. 1.
41. Ibid., Jan. 15, 1952, p. 1.
42. Ibid., Jan. 25, 1952, p. 1.
43. Ibid., Feb. 3, 1952, p. 1.

663 to indicate that the Communists deliberately
668 exaggerated the seriousness of the "crimes" of businessmen in order to justify the severe sentences. In addition, terrorism and threats provided the Communists with a means of keeping government and Party workers in line.

As the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns drew to a close, P'eng Ch'en, the mayor of Peking, estimated that among the 50,000 private business firms in the city, only 5,000 were absolutely free of corruption. This would seem to imply that approximately 90 per cent of the private business firms in the city of Peking were accused and penalized in one way or another.

Although the 1952 campaigns slackened in intensity, corruption cases continued to increase with the expansion of government activities. Of particular interest is the growing corruption discovered in the financial and economic departments of the local government. An editorial in the Ta-kung Pao (Ta-kung Daily), Tientsin, referred to a report made at the conclusion of the inspection of 25 provincial and municipal departments of commerce: from January 1953 to June 1954, some 1,268 instances of corruption involving 1,826 people were investigated by the inspection teams. In the same report, it was hinted that corruption was rife in all major cities in the North China Region. Ch'ien Ying, of the Ministry of Supervision of the State Council, in a [44]

44. People's Daily, July 28, 1955, p.3.

speech at the Second Session of the National People's Congress, revealed that more than 5,100 cases of corruption were reported in the nation as a whole during the inspection of eight financial and economic departments in 1954.

C. Theft and Waste

Theft and waste were the two "poisons" singled out for prosecution during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. "Theft" included cheating on government contracts and engaging in theft of state property; "waste" included any act which resulted in the loss of state property. Although no crime syndicates have been exposed in the major cities of the North China Region, the incidence of theft was reported to be on the increase.

At the same time, instances of waste were made public. Among the wasteful acts singled out for attention in the Communist press were the accumulation of surplus materials, especially food and other necessary commodities, by state-owned commercial firms. It was reported at the National Supervisory Conference in 1955 that, during the second half of the previous year, an inspection of 500 financial and economic agencies and over 23,000 food-storage warehouses had revealed the large-scale surplus accumulation of parts and materials, involving a loss of 350,000,000 yuan (new currency), in factories under the direct management of eight economic ministries.[45] Commodities valued at 8,100,000,000

45. Enlightenment Daily, June 13, 1955, p. 1; July 28, 1955, p. 3.

663 yuan were reported to have been wastefully stored
668 in commercial departments in certain cities, including Tientsin. Equally serious was the announcement of the improper storage of surplus foodstuffs, resulting in the spoilage of a rice crop estimated at 466,000,000 pounds. The waste of rationed food also was cited in certain places in North China, as were the mismanagement and large-scale waste of rationed food in mess halls in the Taiyuan mining area.[46]

III. TENSION AND PUBLIC DISCONTENT

668 Public discontent and tension are invariably the result of excessive centralization of government and strict regimentation of the populace in any state. The Communist regime in China has not only regulated and restricted the people through Party, state and mass organizations, but also has imposed on the population terror, high taxation, and extensive public obligations. Despite the attempts of the Communists to seek popular support and persuade the people to believe in a brighter future, both discontent and tension in China today cannot be overlooked or minimized.

Popular unrest is evident in the regime's continuance and periodic intensification of the program of suppressing the counterrevolutionaries. Other signs are latent in frequent press references to the undesirable effects produced by depriving the various sections of the population of their free time and forcing them to participate

46. Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily] Tientsin, March 16, 1955, p. 1.

668 in indoctrination, propaganda, and other activities. Still another clue to domestic unrest may be detected from the regime's admission of popular resistance to implementation of the marriage law and the consequent necessity of making the reorientation of marriage and family practices a long-term and continuing task. From such clues to restiveness in the population and from our knowledge of human reaction to excessive regimentation, the casues and pattern of public discontent and tension can be treated with some accuracy.

A. Public Discontent

668 47 The Communists' regimentation of the people and all their activities is a primary cause of resistance and discontent among the populace. The establishment of agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural districts and the organization of all workers into unions are notable examples of attempts to achieve complete control.

The restrictions resulting from regimentation cause great inconveience. However, the demand that spare-time be deovted entirely to various Party-inspired activities and duties is even more objectionable. Peasants are required to attend meetings, go to winter schools, keep advised of all farm matters, and perform various other duties depending upon the sex and age of the individual. Even how the farmers spend their money is circumscribed by Party counseling. Advice on the disposition of his excess cash is imparted by a Party member in a series of interviews heavily spiked with propaganda. The

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471 process is not only time-consuming but also trying on the collective patience of the peasants.

City dwellers are forced to accept similar restrictions. On the job, workers are required to observe "labor discipline." They are severely punished for tardiness or for leaving the factory early. Loafing and belligerence are punishable crimes. During off-hours, workers are required to participate in all organizational and cultural activities and attend technical and cultural classes. Participation in mass meetings, propaganda discussion groups, and urban community committees is expected.

B. High Taxation and Public Obligation

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668 The high taxes and many business restrictions imposed by the Communist regime are likewise unpopular. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, formulated at the end of 1953, is a measure to tax and to restrict the production, purchasing, and marketing of farm produce. The forced sale of surplus products mainly rice and cotton-- at a central, government-controlled market has created great resentment among the peasantry. Urban businesses are subject to a similar scheme of taxation and control. Businessmen must pay high taxes, purchase bonds, and make regular "voluntary contributions" to government-sponsored organizations.

668 Public obligations imposed upon the
653 people are a further cause of public discontent.

668 The average peasant, for example, is required to
653 perform duties for the state periodically or on demand. The four seasonal drives in the rural districts require his active participation. In the construction of flood-control projects, peasants are forced to abandon their fields to labor in distant regions. For one such project in Hopei, about 125,000 workers were drafted. The service of the militia has been necessary to force compliance on many occasions. Young peasants are required to perform military service whenever the state deems it necessary. City dwellers are not exempt from similar public service, being subject to patrol duty in their own and neighboring areas whenever needed.

668 Controls imposed upon the people by security agencies and other organizations have been frequent causes of public discontent. The large-scale rationing program enforced in the cities and the constant investigations conducted by public security agencies cause a great deal of anger, if not threat of rebellion. Depsite the Communists' attempts to avoid the flagrant use of threats and force in approaching and controlling the public, the regime has been far from successful in preventing public discontent.

668 1. Tension within Organizations. The
647 employment of various control agencies to supervise and ensure the execution of Party directives has created suspicion and tension within the control agencies themselves and the supervised state, Party, and mass organizations.

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Because the jurisdictions of the various control agencies often overlap, a government office or a factory may be subject to several controls at the same time. Pressure may be simultaneously exerted by as many as four control agencies-- the Control Committee of the Party, the supervisory office of the administration, the People's procuratorate, and one of the public security teams. Although the immediate focus of the policing agencies may differ, the effect of the multi-control system is to press in on every organization from all sides to extend its control to each member.

Tension within organizations also results from over-centralization. In any centralized and "planned" society, not only are economic decisions based on a master plan, but all political and social policies are determined by directives originating at the head office. Pressures increase in direct proportion to the distance from the originating office; thus tension is greatest at the bottom of the chain of command. In politics, for example, directives emanate from the central government and are pssed on to the provincial government, and then to the governments on lower levels. This process continues until the desired result is achieved at the lowest political unit.

In the field of economic acitivity, each factory is given a production quota, assigned in a manner similar to that followed in political decisions. To fulfill this quota, every possible means of control is resorted to. The pressure, engendered, is constant. Both management and labor are held directly responsible for the attainment of assigned quotas. Failure to meet them

668 means severe penalties. Recently, the Communists attempted to improve their system of checking on the fulfillment of production quotas in order to eliminate the practice of submitting false reports of production achievements -- a strategy attempted in order to afford some temporary relief from mounting pressures.

2. Tension within Party Organizations.

668 Within the Party organizations themselves the 665 increase in pressure and tension is most revealing of the harm done to morale. In the first place, the Party apparatus is the center of power and activity for the regime. All Party directives and government policies are implemented by the Party bureaus. A Party member is subject to at least two systems of pressure -- that of the Party and that of the state. Secondly, Party members are subject to such an endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification that many of them cannot withstand such pressure, resulting often in their expulsion from the Party. Many people outwardly in favor of the regime, become reluctant to join the Party. Most of the people expelled from the Party are confined in prison or forced labor camps; but some of them remain at large and could conceivably have joined discontented groups. Unless evidence to the contrary is disclosed, it can be presumed that some of the expelled Party members are willing to unite with subversive elements in a concerted effort to oust the present regime.

668 3. Tension within Mass Organizations.

Party pressure on mass organizations also leads

668 to tension. The broadest and also the most unstable mass organizations are the Democratic Youth Corps and the All-China Federation of Democratic Women. Lacking a common political, economic, or community base, these organizations are composed of heterogeneous social and political elements, directly or indirectly coerced into membership. These groups must be handled carefully. The key to preventing tensions within an organization from expanding beyond safe limits seems to lie in constant vigilance and an incessant barrage of propaganda. By instituting stricter controls and by disposing of undesirable members, the Communists have sought to keep these organizations in the service of the Party.

CONCLUSION

Subversive potentialities cannot be always contained however effective a dictatorship or tyranny may be. There are always the forces in opposition to a rule of terror -- the victims of power, the traditional resistance groups, and discontented ex-members of the party in control. The vicitims of Communist power -- landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and others elements which have been named by the Communists as "counterrevolutionaries" -- have made repeated attempts to resist the present regime. As the "new-rich" increases in number and as peasant opposition grows in intensity, it is likely that old anti-Communist elements may become more active. The traditional resistance group, represented by the revived secret societies, has shown

668 perserverance and resiliency under the Communist regime. Although the Communist government in the North China Region has done all in its power to eliminate them, their complete extermination is far from a reality. Since secret societies are composed largely of peasant and working people, it is ironic that a state which claims to protect the interests of the proletariat and "the people" is beginning to find itself unpopular among them.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China
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348 (7,500 per acre) to 45,000 (11,250 per acre) to 67,500 (16,875 per acre).[31]

VII. COMMENTS

464 668 166 In the spring of 1955, the "Back-to-the-Villages Campaign was launched in most of the large cities in China in an effort to persuade or force peasants to return to the rural districts. Many peasants, dissatisfied with the rigorous demands made upon them and the arduous life on the farms, had abandoned farming and gone to the cities in search of an easier livelihood. Although conditions in North China are not as discouraging as in the East and Central-South China regions, the fixing of production quotas (often increased arbitrarily), the collection of grain tax (always a heavy drain on the farmer), and the forced sale of grain (at fixed prices) to the government have exerted a tremendous burden on the poor farmer. Communist cadres have attempted to foist agricultural producers' co-operatives upon the rural masses, who found no way of expressing their resentment or reluctance at this forced change in their farming methods except by abandoning their plots of land and seeking work in areas less

31. Ibid.

464 strictly controlled. Most of the peasants
•668 who fled to the cities found it difficult to make
166 a living, since industry cannot quickly absorb inexperienced workers. Another serious problem caused by the increase of city populations was the subsequent need for grain-rationing. Furthermore, prices are relatively higher in the city, and this fact alone may tend to drive the unemployed to rural districts where the danger of starvation is not so immediately felt. However, it is doubtful if these serious problems can be solved by the Back-to-the-Villages Campaign, unless the Communists recognize the need to modify the severity of their rural policies.

4: Burgess E-4.5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12

tion of woman labor in the factory (formerly they manufactured only in the homes), night work for women and children,[1] the concentration of large numbers of workers in the large cities, with the attendant overcrowding and general bad housing conditions.[2] Labor has been recruited in many cases by labor contractors who have profited by the low wages.[3] The large number of workers in the factory unit, added to the contract system, has destroyed the former close personal relation between master and men. These and many other changes in the life of the laborers, unmitigated by enforceable labor legislation,[4] have brought discontent and class hatred, with strikes that frequently result in bloodshed.[5]

The passivity of the workers is disappearing and a class-conscious labor movement is developing. In the tending of the machine the sense of creative accomplishment has gone.

44 per cent); two-thirds of these children were victims of machinery accidents, the majority having received head or hand injuries. It was the night shifts which suffered most, as indeed happens wherever work is carried on continuously."—Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[4] Adelaide M. Anderson, *Humanity and Labour in China* (London, 1926), chap. vii, "Things Industrial Seen in China," pp. 163-202.

[1] Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[3] *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

[5] Ta Chen, *Analysis of Strikes in China from 1918 to 1926* (Shanghai, 1926) and *The Labor Movement in China*, pp. 19-20. Henry, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21: "It is accordingly in modern factories, in spite of the immense superiority of their workshops as regards equipment, that the elements of revolt among the workers are fomented. Strikes and mutinies, the latter going so far as the assassination of foremen, increase year by year. The origin of these movements does not lie solely in the propaganda of a few leaders; they are also undoubtedly the outcome of too sudden a disturbance of the old equilibrium, of a certain social disorganization common to transition periods such as China is passing through under the influence of modern ideas, and even of the moral anarchy provoked in certain cases by the sudden abandonment of the family system."